Introduction
Future demand for petroleum products from the Caspian region will be determined in large part by the growth in the world economy and the price of petroleum products. Given the prices of petroleum products, the costs associated with development and extraction and the distribution of Caspian petroleum products to the world economy will determine Caspian petroleum production rates. A number of recent studies have examined these and related issues as they relate to this key region of the world (Glantz and Zonn, 1997; Ebel, 1997 Ebel, , 2000 Amineh, 1999; Horsnell, 2000; Jaffe, 2000 , Kohl, 2000 . One recurrent theme in these studies is the poor profitability potential for private companies and/or producing countries in the Caspian region. Another is the necessity for pipeline development through politically sensitive areas of the Middle East and Central and East Asia since the energy producing countries of the region are landlocked.
In this paper we specifically consider the potential for rising oil demand for the high cost oil that will come on line in the next several decades from the Caspian region.
An undercurrent of two main questions motivates our substantive analysis. What justification is there for the development of Caspian oil fields in the period 2010-2020?
Will there be sufficient demand for the high cost oil from that region expected to come on line in the period 2010-2020? We focus on the next several decades and we develop new methodologies to forecast such growth for several reasons. First, this is roughly the time it will take to develop the Caspian region to the extent necessary to derive important scale economies from production and distribution activities. Second, this is roughly the period it is expected to take before world oil price increases may provide the economic justification for such development. Third, complementary forecasting alternatives to U.
S. Department of Energy forecasting methods provide us with a more robust set of scenarios that are not overly leveraged by the assumptions of their forecasting model.
Clearly, motivation for development of the Caspian region's petroleum reserves is based largely on future trends in world economic development.
The commonly used economic growth model predicts that countries converge to their own steady states, which mean that with assumed identical technologies across countries, exogenous differences in savings (investment), employment, and education cause the observed country differences in levels of income and rates of growth. However, countries differ not only in accumulation rates, but also use different technologies. In fact, hardly any group of countries fits the assumption of identical technologies. The existence of a technology gap may therefore present an additional opportunity for growth through technology flows. If so, then a nation's ability to adopt and absorb new knowledge must also be considered.
We use the standard model but augment it to include technology gaps and differing adoption capabilities. The possibility of adopting technology from more advanced countries is added through a catch-up term. This adoption potential may be compromised due to varying political and social rigidities. This means that the technologies used in the Petro-chemical and oil industries in the Caspian region (Chapter xx) might be enhanced through the adoption of foreign technology, but it thus adoption process might be hampered by the region's unique institutional composition (Chapter xx).
We present empirical tests of these ideas using panel data. In particular, we use an extension of the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) methodology in which one slope coefficient is allowed to vary across countries and regions and the included fixed effects are meant to capture all inevitable country and regional heterogeneity due to varying social and political institutions. This estimation was performed on countries for which data is available through the Penn World Tables.
Our results allow us to determine the length of time required for particular countries in the sample to converge to the US per capita income level, which is world standard. These catch-up times are then used for the main purpose of this Chapter, namely to predict increases in energy use that would be necessary if, given exogenous rates of populations growth, rates of development were such that per capita energy consumption converged to the US level. Based on forecasts from the Energy Information Administration, we allocate the energy use among the various categories "oil," "coal,"
and "other" to forecast oil consumption by country. World energy demands are then developed and compared to baseline estimates from the Department of Energy. We find remarkable similarity between our forecasts and those from the US Department of Energy through the year 2015, when our forecast ends. This exercise thus casts light on the demand for oil products the Caspian region is likely to face in the few decades.
The next two sections of the essay briefly discuss the growth model and its estimation. The fourth section highlights the data and the econometric model. Results and energy forecasts are reported in the fifth section, which is followed by a conclusion.
Theoretical Model
The model used in our estimation is a modification of the Solow growth model that allows for the transmission of technological knowledge across national borders. i The standard model predicts that countries converge to steady states determined by levels of accumulation and the depreciation rate. However, in addition to having different accumulation rates economies also differ in levels of technology. This introduces the possibility that technology flows may provide additional growth. That is, adoption of technology from abroad is a possible mechanism through which the capital stock of a nation increases, as better technology improves the productivity of the existing stock of capital.
A Model with Technology Adoption
The estimation builds on the standard neoclassical model with a Cobb-Douglas production function
where output Q depends on technology A, physical capital stock K, employment L, and human capital H (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992) . All countries are represented by i, i=1,...,N, in each time period t, t=1,...,T. We use the common specification of the evolution of exogenous world technology and number of workers so that
We include human capital as a factor of production, but other authors have shown how it might affect the growth process through different channels.
ii We consider the human capital growth in our derivation, but we also include its level in the estimation. The only difference from the standard model appears in the equation for capital evolution. The evolution of capital depends on an exogenous saving rate, the depreciation rate, and a technology catch-up term, ξ(T,T W ), so that
We assume here that new investment may embody differences in technical design so that a new "machine" may be more efficient than an old "machine" even if there is no difference in physical capacity. That is, in our setup technology from abroad make existing and new capital stock more productive and therefore increases the capital stock (capital measured in efficiency units). We specify the catch-up term as a logarithmic function of the inverse ratio of labor productivity, Y i =(Q it /L it ), to the "desired" level of labor productivity, Y i *, which differ between countries ξ it (T, T W ) it =ρ i ln(Y i,t-1 */Y i,t-1 ).
Using a desired level of labor productivity reflects the belief that all countries are not able to obtain the same level of productivity. For example, the countries in the Caspian region may not be able to adopt the entire technology gap between themselves and the US because of institutional inefficiencies. This is included into the model as a term that acts to reduce the available technology gap to economies. This term captures much more than mere production slack, as it encompasses the institutional framework, adjustment costs, international openness, and so forth. So, to account for varied institutional rigidities, we postulate that the desired or maximum level of labor productivity, controlling for institutional features, is some fraction of the leader's productivity, and that the fraction is determined by the nation's level of inefficiency
where Y L t is the leader's labor productivity and E it is the inefficiency parameter.
iii Log linearizing and differencing the production function and substituting for the growth rate of capital yields that the growth rate of per worker output depends on the growth of factor inputs as well as the productivity gap which is adjusted for the country's inefficiency,
where ρ i =β 1 θ i is the country-specific technology adoption rate and φ=(γ-β 1 δ) is net exogenous technology growth.
That is, the growth rate of GDP per worker for country i depends on the rate of growth of factor inputs, the common rate of exogenous technological change minus capital depreciation, country-specific inefficiency, and the technology gap between the leader and the follower countries lagged one period. Interpretation of the parameters are straightforward: β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 show the elasticity of per worker GDP to a change in the growth of factor inputs, ρ i , is the adoption of available technology from abroad and the (estimated) inefficiency measure, ρ i lnE i,t-1 , shows the reduction in growth of labor productivity due to political and social factors that reduces the available technology gap.
iv
The key to this model is that it allows for countries to either leap ahead or fall behind since countries may differ in both technology adoption rates and inefficiency levels. 
Data and Econometric Model
For the empirical estimation we predominantly use variables from the Summers and
Heston data set (Penn World Tables Mark 5.6). Number of workers is the labor variable.
The number of workers was found by multiplying each nation's population by its labor force participation rate. v For physical capital growth we use the share of investment in output as a proxy. The rate of growth of depreciated capital stock is missing for several nations and time periods, so its use was not possible. Implicit in the use of this proxy is that the capital-output ratios are constant across time and countries so that the growth rate of physical capital will be proportional to the investment ratio. vi For the human capital variable, we use the percentage share of total population that attained secondary education from Barro and Lee (1993) . Secondary schooling is favored over primary education since many countries in the sample are likely to have reached their upper limits for primary education.
The econometric methodology uses panel data estimation, namely an extension of the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) framework. A problem with ordinary least squares estimation (such as LSDV) is that a lagged dependent variable exists on the righthand side of the estimable equation, a problem common to many economic relationships that are dynamic in nature. Many alternative approaches exist to solve this problem, but Islam (1995) concluded that for our data set LSDV is in fact an appropriate estimation technique.
Results
The model described above (equation 1) is estimated using a fixed effect panel data estimator in order to capture the inevitable country heterogeneity due to political and social institutions. The results of these estimations are given in Table 2 .1 and contrasted to the estimation using initial income as an explanatory variable (which is the common variable in the convergence literature). Including fixed effects lead to highly significant results for almost all countries (with the exception of the Netherlands and Mexico). When considering the three regions separately, a different regional heterogeneity ranking is obtained. However, the change in estimated fixed effects is accompanied by technology adoption rates of different magnitudes across the three regions. This indicates that fixed effects may pick up the countries' different abilities to incorporate new technology as well.
To explore whether the fixed effects in fact contain the ability of nations to adopt new technology, we estimate the model using an extension of the LSDV methodology. In particular, we allow one slope coefficient (the technology adoption parameter) to vary across countries and regions (Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles, 1990) . vii We thus estimate both adoption speeds and "inherent" inefficiency levels as country-specific parameters.
The added fixed effect (whether five year or annual pooling is used) yields highly significant negative coefficients for all countries, confirming our hypothesis that the US is the productivity leader in our sample(s). of future populations. The forecast of total energy is carried out for every five-year period using 1994 as the base year. We assume that US energy consumption is growing at its population growth rate in order to maintain constancy in its per capita energy consumption. World energy consumption is the sum of the consumption of all of the countries and that of the US. Comparisons of per capita consumption and total consumption of the US versus the world indicate that per capita consumption of the world is upward sloping and is converging to the frontier country, the US. The temporal pattern of total energy consumption is consistent with the implications of convergence in that the world's total energy consumption is growing at a faster rate than that in the United States.
We can decompose the major components of energy demand in our convergence-based forecasts. Consumption of petroleum products in the various countries used in our forecasts is based on Energy Balances of OECD Countries, 1994-1995 and Energy Statistics and Balances of non-OECD Countries, 1994 -1995 (OECD Paris, 1997a , 1997b . Catch-up time is used to forecast the consumption of petroleum products as with the forecasts of total energy consumption in coal equivalents. We summarize our forecasts at the regional and world level (Table 2 .2) and the estimates from the US Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration in Table 2 .3. These show remarkable overlap. Clearly our modeling effort has succeeded in closely replicating the forecasts from the Department of Energy, an agency of the federal government with substantially more resources than those devoted to our modeling exercise. This in itself is an interesting result.
Forecasts for the year 2005 and 2010 reveal that if production from non-OPEC provinces continues to grow at a rate commensurate with expansion seen over the past decade, the amount of oil from the Middle East needed to meet rising world oil demand requirements could be significantly reduced. Non-OPEC production has expanded by 1 to Basin production. The level of exportable surplus from the Caspian is and will continue to be a issue. However, even under the most favorable assumptions, Caspian production might allow for 2.3 million barrels per day of export by 2010 and 3.6 by 2020 (Kohl, 2000) amounting to only about 3-4% of world oil supply by 2010 (Jaffe, 2000) .
Under this moderate non-OPEC expansion scenario, the expectation is that oil will be oversupplied by the years 2005-2010. This is under both the high-and lowdemand growth cases. The period is likely to witness a substantial increase in the amount of production capacity that will have to be shut in by OPEC or other producers to defend even moderate price levels. Under this scenario, Caspian Basin oil production will not be critical for maintaining moderate oil prices for at least another decade, assuming, as seems reasonable, that historically persistent competition continues within OPEC.
The above conclusion is illustrated in Table 2 .5 (Table 2 .4 shows the low-growth forecasts), which projects anticipated production levels for various players in the international oil market under a moderate production growth scenario that matches historical trends for price and rate of capacity expansion. Caspian Basin production will not be critical for maintaining moderate oil prices for at least another decade, assuming, as seems reasonable, that historically persistent competition continues within OPEC.
Conclusions
We argued that performing growth accounting with only the common factors of production is not sufficient to explain the growth process since the long run scenario of fully diffused technology has not arrived. Since countries differ in both technology and institutions we chose to use a model that contains three growth effects in addition to varying accumulation rates. Each nation is faced with a technology gap approximated by the difference to the leader in per worker output, which can increase the productivity of capital. We also include heterogeneous absorption capacities and adoption rates in the growth model. Thus a nation might not take advantage of the catch-up potential if it either fails to adopt foreign technology or technology absorption is seriously compromised due to the nation's level of inefficiency.
Estimations of our model yield results comparable to previous research as well as significant country heterogeneity and regional adoption rates. We found the required times for the nations to catch up with both their inefficiency frontiers and to the leader's frontier, the latter requiring declining inefficiency levels. We then used these heterogeneous catch-up times to benchmark the rates of growth of different countries within the world economy to the standard of energy intensity used in the Unites States.
Based on the hypothesis that countries within the world economy are converging to the energy intensive production technology utilized in the US we constructed forecasts of energy use and decomposed these into specific demand forecasts for oil demand.
Interestingly enough, these are found to be in close agreement with those generated from the Department of Energy's Energy Information Agency.
Our forecasts show that world oil demand will grow to 80 The fact that the convergence time will be identical to the Solow-Swan model, but that the convergence path is very different can be seen if our model is simulated (see Figure   2 .2). The simulations show the effect on the convergence path when an economy does or does not adopt technology when assuming identical steady states for all economies (that is, identical saving rates) and also how inefficiency changes converegence paths. i For more detailed information about this model, see Hultberg (1999) .
ii Several possibilities have been suggested (Benhabib & Spiegel, 1994; Kyriacou, 1992) . Levine and Renelt (1992) find that average level of secondary education enrollment is a robust determinant of per capita GDP. The only other two robust explanatory variables in their study are investment share of GDP and initial real GDP per capita. We include employment growth as well.
iii The difference comes from the technology function, which is redefined as ξ(ln(Y),ln(Y w ),E) t =-ρln(EY t /Y w t ), where E≥1, and thus acts to reduce the available technology gap. Accordingly the economy may run out of available technology before its capital intensity is equal to the leader nation. An alternative to this approach would be to make the adoption rate, ρ, a function of absorption capacity.
iv In the estimation we use both 5-year and annually pooled data. The parameters must of course be interpreted accordingly.
v A measure of labor input such as hours of work is preferred, but this variable was not available. From Summers and Heston (1991) , number of workers = (RGDPCH / RGDPW) * POPULATION.
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vi The growth rate of capital is given by, k it = (I i,t-1 / Y i,t-1 ) z, where z is a constant representing the unchanging capital-output ratio. This is an assumption that finds validation in Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) for the OECD sample and Oroczo, Hultberg, and Sickles (1996) ix To test the robustness of these measures we estimate the model using annual data as well. The annual results are also significant, except for East Asia. It is also for East Asia that the annual results differ from the 5-year panel results.
x The per capita energy consumption and total energy consumption data in 1994 are from United Nations (1996) . The growth rates of countries not in Table 2 , including India, China, Russia, Eastern Europe and other countries in the former Soviet Union, and those in Africa are calculated as weighted averages of the rest of the countries since those three countries were not included in the former catch-up time forecast.
